

Chapter 10

"A broader, pragmatic empiricism"

Empiricism: measurably human

As we saw in (the Preface and) Chapter 1, "empiricism" is the old philosophical tradition holding that we human beings can only know (especially in the sense that we may all agree upon what we know) that which comes to us through (the evidence of our) experience. Its "narrow" interpretation is one that is favoured by behaviorists in particular, and science - as a fashion - in general. Science is a fashion; i.e., a passing contemporary philosophy - rather than any kind of permanent "gospel" - because it has existed for only a few hundred of the 200,000 years in all human history and - unlike sex, mind-altering relief and rock 'n' roll - it will not last forever. There is too much of the quality of human experience that is not accounted for by superstition, delusion and prejudice on the one hand - or materialist, positivist, (yet) strident science on the other. Even within science there are deep anomalies (cf. the "Uncertainty Principle" - see Chapter 4) and apparently irreconcilable accounts of the same phenomena. The antagonism between Newtonian and Einsteinian accounts of material subject to strong versus weak gravity or at light-proximate velocities - hence our obsession with accounting for the earliest possible moment of the Big Bang - is a modern case in point. In Chapter 4 we also wondered whether humans lack the capacity to know everything anyway - even if only on the grounds that we will always be limited by the constraints of our capacity as perspective-takers (see footnote to Chapter 4). In Chapter 4's Table, "Examples of polarisation from ancient and modern history", we imagined that:

Surely any final "theory of everything" will be less about what humans can measure than it will be "measurably human".

Breadth of thinking: if the cap fits

Whereas in Chapter 1 we elucidated "narrow" empiricism thus:

It is a corollary of empiricism that "innate" knowledge (ideas, revelation, inspiration, intuition - even reason) either doesn't exist or is spurious (with the possible exception of "knowledge" transmitted via DNA), and the extent to which one is "radical" about such matters is (inversely) proportional to the extent to which one tolerates exceptions to these strictures.

in Chapter 4, we appealed to common-sense:

Taking common-or-garden human experience for a moment, let us test our common-sense pulse, or ground ourselves in a broader empiricism - which is just to say rely on the subjective experience of life and living that we all possess.

and in a footnote to Chapter 4 we explained:

the roots of the English word "empirical" are in the Ancient Greek ("ἐμπειρικός" in modern Greek) translating to Latin as "experientia", meaning "experience". A "broader empiricism" here just means a broader experience, i.e., not limited to sensory experience alone. Folks can and do testify to and agree upon the meaning of common types of experience as well as to the slide rule or yardstick. Without such shared understandings human relationships would be dry if not impossible.

Pragmatic empiricism: Charles Darwin on board ...

By "pragmatic" we mean simply some framework which is useful to us for the purpose of a "moral psychology" but which represents neither capitulation to easy superficial convenience, nor lip service to reasonable and consensual validation. Now, we all know that Charles Darwin (1809-1882) was a privileged passenger on board HMS Beagle (i.e., a self-financing²³¹ companion to the aristocrat Robert FitzRoy, 1805-1865, then captain of the ship and later to rise to Vice-Admiral of the British Navy²³²) as, on her second voyage from 1831 to 1836, she journeyed through the Galapagos Islands. We are indebted to Darwin for our present appreciation of *Man's Place In Nature*²³³ knowing now (for none of us had done so hitherto, so we are given to understand) that we humans evolved like every other form of life on earth - and, possibly, for the same chronological span since a "last universal common ancestor". This happens, by all accounts, through the process of natural selection (or "survival of the fittest"), and speciation (into *homo sapiens* in our case) when an ancestral lineage has become sufficiently differentiated (in terms of what we have discovered as genetic material or DNA) that breeding between the old and new stock becomes impossible (infertile). Such differentiation, naturally, takes an "impossibly" long time - far too long, in fact, for the impatient empiricist who must measure everything scientific not only in his laboratory, and on his own slide rule, but also in his own lifetime. In those quieter and less populated days before electronic communications, handwritten letters were the order of the day, and Charles Darwin was fond of them. Rather as Sigmund Freud used to exchange thoughts, ideas and arguments about the unconscious "mind" and its analysis - bartering all the new tricks of the old trade with Carl Jung before the Great War (i.e., the very early 20th century), Darwin engaged in a similar manner with just as ardent a devotee - in fact, a hard-nosed man reputed as "Darwin's bulldog" - Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895). Huxley was less disposed than Darwin to accept any given proposition; conversely we might say, he required more evidence to accept the same idea; i.e., he was a "narrower" empiricist. As Huxley steadfastly refused in their correspondence to recognise natural selection as irrefutable until such speciation could be observed empirically (i.e., at first hand), Darwin wrote:

*The empirical evidence you call for is both impossible in practical terms, and in any event unnecessary. It's the same as asking to see every step in the transformation (or the splitting) of one species into another.*²³⁴

Darwin's position is very much like ours in so far as we anticipate empirical confirmation of the intrapsychic transitions that accompany "spiritual direction" and the achievement or maintenance of personal sanity (i.e., the species-grade makeover seen in anyone who undergoes "spiritual transformation"). We have presented a clear account of those who can recognise such psychological shifts in another person -

²³¹ Although a naturalist as HMS Beagle sailed forth, Darwin was bound for the clergy.

²³² Like his uncle Robert Stewart (Lord Castlereagh, 1769-1822) who had also been a sea captain - in those days widely recognised as a stressful and isolating occupation - FitzRoy committed suicide with a razor as in later life his depression prevailed over him and his accumulating health and financial problems. FitzRoy had become disturbed at his vicarious contribution to Darwin's theories - once exhorting an audience at the British Association for the Advancement of Science to "believe God rather than man".

²³³ See Chapter 8 including footnote.

²³⁴ Darwin, F. and Seward, A.C. (1903) *More Letters Of Charles Darwin: A Record Of His Work In A Series Of Hitherto Unpublished Letters (Volume 1)*. John Murray: London

the "poachers-turned-gamekeeper", or PTGs we described in Chapter 9. These people need no convincing to appreciate something with which they are already familiar because of first hand experience. Of course, we are all human and - in that capacity - none of us requires any special qualification to recognise anything "measurably human".

... but we do not venture so far as William James

In working our way towards such a position we are aligned - although not entirely - with William James's (1842-1910) views on pragmatism (*Pragmatism: A New Name For Some Old Ways Of Thinking*, 1907). We do not venture so far as where he argues not merely that evidence can be circumvented if a belief holds its own through having been useful ("If it works for you, it works for you" - see Chapter 7), but that it becomes validated through such a process²³⁵. Our empiricism is less broad. We are not looking for incontrovertible (especially material) proof that "moral psychology" promotes "sanity", but neither are we willing to accommodate what James refers to as "over-beliefs" - or anything that looks like an artefactual solution, a red herring or a blind alley - just because, seemingly, it "works" (and so that's all OK with us then). As in our personal lives, we wish to persevere in trying to get somewhere authentic, even if we don't succeed visibly.

Ticks our boxes

A staggeringly potent social phenomenon with which we are already familiar; i.e., "shareable subjective experience" (see Chapters 5, 7 and 9) leaps all of the hurdles we have encountered in defining our terms of reference (empirical support; breadth of limits; pragmatism and, so, relevance). Unless we indulge in esoteric diversions, such as enquiring into whether the universe and humans within it really exist, and whether our psychic faculties are sufficiently equivalent for us to recognise and access each other's "frame of reference" (vital in Rogerian or person-centred counselling - see Chapter 9), we have a great deal in common with each other (see Chapter 3) as we know from the ways in which we share about our experiences harnessing our species-specific language. The expression, "No man is an island" is well-established in folklore, and originates in Meditation XVII of Devotion XVII amongst *Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions* written in late life and ill health by the English Catholic-turned-Anglican (following Henry VIII's bloodbath) poet John Donne (1572-1631) who lived much of his apparently arduous life supported by wealthy friends. The saying is entrenched in human tradition like religion as William James sees it; i.e., it survives because it "works". "No man is an island" refers to the common notion and sentiment that we all need each other - even if we are selective about the company we keep.

Give away (or share) what you want to keep

We have suggested in Chapter 9 that:

Group or dyadic human engagement of any kind takes away "emptiness" of and in itself: much of our personal restlessness and malaise is dissolved in any kind of togetherness.

In a "moral psychology", the kind and quality of togetherness that is characterised by common purpose and honest sharing serves two highly significant purposes aside from relief from "emptiness". People do us favours if they let us "get things off our chest" or "unburden". The icing on the cake is that we get to keep what we share or give away.

²³⁵ William James was firmly of the view that religious beliefs were justified on the basis that they helped folks live happier and more meaningful lives (coining the jargon "Cash Value" to refer to the appraisal of a belief by its consequences) - and that no other empirical justification for them is or should be required. For James, the endurance of religious beliefs throughout history was evidence that they "worked".

Sweet as icing (truth for the tooth)

If I give something to you by sharing something private about who I am it is like "letting go" of it. It is no longer a secret and I have lost the power that enables me to indulge my secret without my being detected (i.e., I can no longer believe or imagine that nobody on the planet knows what I know about me - even if I am never detected or "found out" literally). If I give you or share my secret, I have lost that power forever (unless you die, but I have still given it away once and that is knowledge to me). But since it is the same power that imprisons me (by keeping me obsessed with a mental comfort - something I use to change the way that I feel), my relinquishing it affords me freedom. It is true that I have lost a comfort. But I have also lost a rancid obsession. It is true that I have (voluntarily) lost a corner of my privacy. But I have gained a priceless freedom. It is true that I have foregone a little of the illusion that kept me believing in my own "self-reliance" or "toughness", but I have gained a peace which can never sensibly be traded. All things said and done, I have trodden a step or two nearer to some worthwhile truth - even if only about who and what I am²³⁶. Of course, such levels of self-revelation are best reserved for trusted environments - where we have made a case for the strictest levels of confidence. The "poachers-turned-gamekeeper" and "spiritual laundering" sections towards the end of Chapter 9 included a broader set of reflections on sharing in private and in groups. Additional material is included in Part III.

Amen (somewhat)

It is this kind of truth that provides a far greater impetus to sanity than any kind of measurement in the behaviorist's laboratory. This is not to argue that science doesn't yield wonders - especially medical ones - nor is it to argue that even radical behaviorists do not generate useful knowledge about aberrant behaviour - laws about the formation of conditioned emotional states that can hold us back in life and which - at least theoretically - can be "unwritten" or otherwise compensated for in therapy. Quite the contrary. We could not have made the case for a "moral psychology" without all of the raw material presented prior to our drawing together its various threads in Chapter 9, "A moral psychology". But the truths of a "moral psychology", once experienced, require no proof for the person who has walked the journey. The dark, dank and dreary cave of the old mystery has been suffused with the luminous power of the new one. We are afforded a sense of purpose (and destiny) for our next discovery. The process gathers "spiritual moss" like a "spiritual rolling stone" (see Chapter 9), until our confidence in it all is unassailable. We might say that this confidence is like faith - and so it somewhat is.

Getting used to the idea

We have alluded to the idea that "spiritual surrender" is like a one-hit (or at least a powerful) associative link shredder (see Chapter 9 including a reference to "flavour aversion"). The "letting go", we have suggested, may be alike sudden and massive habituation whereby (the salience of) a previously highly valued reward is suddenly reduced to nought. Whether this is reflected in the central nervous system (and, even then, whether such a process may impact all of the hypothetical structures with which we are familiar by now: Pavlovian S-S; Thorndikeian S-R; Skinnerian R-S) we are very far from having established. Yet - as in all things both scientific and spiritual - you do find what you're looking for, eventually - and possession of a sound sense of where to turn next is incomparably more helpful than random rummaging about or blind refusal to take another hopeful step.

²³⁶ see John 8:32 for a New Testament parallel: "If you make my word your home you will indeed be my disciples, you will learn the truth and the truth will make you free."



"Another Hopeful Step"
Tintagel, Cornwall

An indispensable principle: willingness to be wrong

Thanks largely to Aristotle, we have inherited a particular tendency in thinking which we may refer to loosely as "deduction". Deductive reasoning is drawing an appropriate conclusion which must necessarily follow from pre-stated premises. If the premises are wrong, the conclusion will be wrong. Deductive reasoning can be sound inherently but generate false conclusions. Thus, if all cats are black, and Felix is a cat, then Felix is black. But if *actually* some cats are white, our conclusion is false. Sound deductive reasoning depends on true premises. By contrast, inductive reasoning can generate false conclusions from true premises. In the oft-cited example courtesy of Karl Popper (1902-1994), Europeans had observed millions of white swans over centuries. Inductive reasoning might have permitted Europeans to conclude that all swans are white. But *only one black swan* imported (or venturing stray) from Australasia would undermine the truth of the conclusion. It is this kind of error that scientists can make when they are insufficiently cautious about generalising findings from their rigidly controlled laboratory experimentation (significantly helpful in nearly all other respects, particularly defence against errors of deduction), and about which Popper was mostly concerned. His solution is based on the principle of "falsification" - meaning that we should try to be explicit about the "black swan" in any edifice of inductive reasoning that we fabricate. Indeed, Popper suggests that we should expend our resources on disproving scientific theories rather than trying to generalise them (or demonstrate over and over how correct - and how clever - we are).

Being wrong in a "moral psychology"

In a "moral psychology" blind or belligerent repudiation of personal error is known (and experienced) as "pride" (actually just another facet of the seam of fear we exposed in Chapter 9). We all know there is only one answer for it: I can admit the mistake to myself and to any injured party; apologise unselfishly wherever possible effecting any necessary reparations for harms done; get back on my horse as quickly as possible, and then leave the matter behind me (bringing my capacity for "spiritual surrender" or "letting go" to bear should any unhappy memories insist upon themselves). Omission of any of these corrective activities represents unexploded munitions of the kind we encountered in Chapter 9 ("*Why do folks pursue certain rather than other distractions?*"). We are best advised to stop what we are doing and retrace our steps until we have straightened things up as best we can (seeking trusted counsel if ever we are confused about a matter).

Poking the "Seahive"

In case, for a moment, any interested reader might be tempted to suspect that we had dispensed with all further calls for evidence, we shall give over the remainder of this Chapter to Karl Popper by presenting instances of how a "moral psychology" might be falsified. We cannot hope to be exhaustive by presenting all of the ideas and principles underwritten in *Nine Seahorses* - but we shall try to highlight the principal ideas - and summarise how these have been represented in earlier Chapters. We shall be imaginative in our attempts to generate scenarios in which a "moral psychology" might be contradicted or fail to apply at all (all of which can be readily converted into "real world" yardsticks in social policy evaluation for the tastefully hard-nosed empiricist). The acid test of such objections is in the sincerity with which they are mounted, and in how discussions (especially in groups where "spiritual blindness" is "averaged over" and often defeated) go this way or that when "moral psychology" is shared amongst honest conversationalists. If you like, this is to encourage a "collective conscience" alongside personal ones. We shall close Part II with reflections on "moral economics".

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"		
Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>The human tendency to polarise generates conflict not co-operation</i>		
Sharing a huge proportion of their DNA, human beings seem bent on differentiating themselves from one another - both as individuals and as groups, communities and nations. Polarities hide truths, and their capacity to mislead may be considered proportional to the vigour with which they are defended. Extremists of all persuasions seem somewhat deranged, and are likely to remain or become more so the longer they cleave to their positions. Every human being who reports a troubled "mind" (unless their presenting problem is an overwhelming threat to existence) has a problem of intrapsychic alignment. Such internal misalignment, arguably, is one way of conceptualising "insanity" <i>per se</i>. To the extent that this is true, the achievement or restoration of sanity must involve establishing or re-establishing intrapsychic congruence or alignment. Psychology is a divided modern discipline because of polar positions on issues such as the "mind-body problem".	... a polarised view rarely, if ever, embodies the whole story - or represents any worthwhile "truth". We might also suspect that the degree of fervour with which a polarised position is defended (especially if violently) is directly proportional to the extent to which its own protagonists may have personal misgivings about it. (p.34) We saw in Chapter 4 that human beings have always had a tendency to "polarise" ... Modern psychology and psychotherapy are disintegrated and unfinished pursuits, largely because of this disposition. Trenchant positions on deep-seated difficulties (un)naturally create tensions within a professional discipline as much as intrapsychic conflict does in persons. Such internal misalignment, arguably, is one way of conceptualising "insanity" <i>per se</i> (which is to suggest that some spurious partitioning of beliefs and values - or "moral conflict" - lies with deleterious effect, lurking invisible unless exposed, behind every instance of experienced distress). (p.85) ... if we become "too" honest with ourselves, we cannot bear the "conscience-weight" of our own irresponsibility ... If we haven't yet grown up, we live a life of chronic burden, always under the suspicion of our own lurking moral gaze, let alone the scrutiny of law. Whichever way you look at it, it is of no use making excuses for self-betrayal. There are two sides to any coin, and we can flip any situation over to look at it another way. We credit ourselves with guile; in fact, it is denial. How do we know it is denial? Because if you hold out playing a "bad game", you find yourself on a losing wicket sooner or later ... You don't need to exclude from your own "moral psychology" any first cause of "conscience", and you need admit and afford hospitality only to those that you choose to invite. (p.76) ... fortunately for all of us other than Adam and Eve, humans have had a longstanding knack of feigning unselfishness if ever there was a sexual union in prospect ... there is now a barely reckonable swarm of us, and the world's human population ... may at last be peaking as bacteria in a crowded Petri dish. We are having to resort to contrived means of food production - moving from ... local agriculture to the global distribution of synthetic commodities - the cost of which can be measured in contamination of the planet's ecosystem and potentially catastrophic climate change, as well as traditional economic metrics. (p.99)	Although we weren't there to witness it all, and recorded human history is very patchy (practically non-existent until not many thousands of years ago), we can imagine natural selection in action as <i>homo sapiens</i> evolved and distinguished itself as a primate species. As the human population is likely to peak for the first time ever in the next few decades - following massive exponential growth in only a few centuries - the question now seems to be whether the human disposition towards mutual co-operation (for which there is just as much evidence in history as there is for intra-species antagonism) can prevail over our gluttony for mutual conflict - so promoting (or assuring) our peaceable survival. Aside from the raw competition instinct, the greatest threats to human survival are the rule of self-interest, the prioritisation of economic growth and weapons technology. Contraindications for a "moral psychology" include arguments that: humanity will save itself through inter- and intra-species competition; that "might is right"; that intrapsychic congruence can be established at extreme points of view. Exercise: Conduct a personal inventory of all your delicate viewpoints. Locate them on dimensions. Move up a gear or two. How do you feel? "The more I locate my opinions at the edges -so marginalising myself in humanity - the more congruent I feel within myself and with others?"

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"

Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>The problem of fear and ulterior motives in a two-faced psychology</i>		
Psychology has always had a lot to do with motives.	Throughout history, human beings have tried to understand one another - whether sympathetically, for practical purposes, or for reasons more akin to conquest ... we have resorted to the most cunning and vile of tactics in high-stake arenas such as the battlefield and the lovers' nest ... psychology seems to have a lot to do with motives. (p.3)	Contraindications include arguments that:
Things are not always as they seem. Most lay perspectives of "psychology" are imbued with a connotation of "reading minds".	Durkheim argued that certain Catholic communities were more healthy than certain Protestant ones based on police suicide statistics entirely; however, how can we know that those Catholics were not less disposed to commit suicide for fear of spiritual damnation rather than because they were happier or otherwise more sane? (p.38)	human beings are rarely dishonest if they are not essentially sincere and ever true to themselves and others;
Whilst social mores dictate that we mustn't talk about motives because they are ulterior and therefore taboo, we cannot have a complete psychology without a comprehensive appreciation of underlying drives.	It was Comte who coined the term "altruism" ... that individuals should subjugate their personal rights in favour of service to others. We can easily imagine, nevertheless, how affording one's services to others can assume varying shades of psychological and relationship significance depending on the underlying motivating factor(s). Whether services are sold for money ... and various other conflicts of interest can intrude (particularly diluting the principle that a paid-for service is geared towards the purchaser's best interests as a primary purpose) ... perhaps the flavour of any service is at least partially coloured by professional ambition(s). (pp.37-38)	most folks have no trouble knowing who they are and are willing to talk about the subject if invited;
All is not fair in love and in war.	Whereas ... Berne's reference to "games" included any transactional behaviour with an ulterior motive, TA has since distinguished between racketeering and games ... the "switch" defining the latter ... when one party ... changes ego state ... leaving everybody feeling uncomfortable and uptight. (p.128)	most of us mean exactly what we say and say exactly what we mean;
Perhaps fear is the dark horse of human motives - one that likes to disguise itself.	Would not our amateur "psychologist" - the one who throughout history played guessing games with his enemy in war, succumbed to treachery in "love", or stooped in compassion to assist a fellow human being in need when no-one was there to witness the beneficent deed (and, somehow, he knew that) - be somewhat disappointed about the shape of the modern discipline? Have not the Scientific Revolution and the limitations of a narrow empiricism (one that appreciates the value of experience only when it is so measurable that we can all see it) excluded the thinking "mind" whose focus the vernacular "psychology" ever was? The agnostic ... in behaviorist terms was thence to be discovered out in the ideological cold. In relation to our "minds" ... are we not now somewhat two-faced? (p.7)	all of our thinking and research in the humanities has been free of contamination by any misreading of human behaviour;
We tend to be ashamed of our own fears.		"wearing one's heart on one's sleeve" is the natural default for humans - hiding one's true feelings is a most extraordinary habit;
Perhaps this is partly because of our culture - not just because we feel "small" when threatened.		romantic love - being everything that matters in a human life - is reliably free of misunderstandings, vengefulness and dastardliness;
Has our culture become obsessed with "toughness"?		acts of "altruism" - which actually means selfless love - i.e., concern for other humans entirely free of personal motive - can always be interpreted at the superficial level: what you see is what is happening.
In what other ways do we cover up our fears?		doing a good turn for its own sake is a mug's or a sucker's game (i.e., no payoff);
Human behaviour cannot be fully understood without appreciation of the actual nature of underlying motives.		winning wars is mostly about brute strength;
Cave man is right.		all human behaviour is "scientifically determined" and, so, talk of intending this or that is diversionary puff and wind;
Modern psychology has become (at least) two-faced.		humans will evolve into robots or vice versa.

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"		
Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>The illegitimacy of free will, empowerment and toughness in nature</i>		
Unbridled human "will", which is illusory anyway, is dangerous, from the highest to the lowest levels of social order. Endeavouring to establish personal superiority always represents an underlying insecurity and undisciplined indulgence of personal or social inferiority. We have been distracted by the spurious notion of psychological "toughness". The pursuit of sanity has far more to do with recognising everybody as "spiritually equal" than it has to do with rendering everybody "tough". Whereas Eric Berne seems to have favoured the pursuit of "autonomy" in its own right, a "moral psychology" prefers to regard popular outcomes of psychotherapy (autonomy, personal responsibility, freedom, happiness) as by-products of the process: they tend to slide through one's "moral fingers" if one grips or harnesses them too tightly. "Become what you are" is associated with Nietzsche, although the expression is more properly attributed to Pindar. Either way, it is a good fit for what a "moral psychology" anticipates.	Now, what happens if we try to apply "free will" against viscosity? Perhaps we may only ever encounter personal frustration in direct proportion to the vigour of our wading in ... Suppose then, as an alternative, we accept that the melting pot of pressures to veer this way or that (behaviourally speaking) is just nature's loving way of helping us out, and that we only experience distress when we fight it? ... might we not all ... accept that nature has spawned us as she has seen fit? Whether we enjoy our days or we are tormented by them, it is sure that we could no more have guided nature through her history than we can re-live our own pasts. (p.165) ... "spiritual surrender" ... precipitates a "spiritual awakening" by which illusory "will" is subjugated to "right-thinking" including: an awareness of the antiquity of nature and a proportionate perspective of our role in her unravelling; a passive (transcendent) appreciation of beauty, and a mature compassion for all humankind (p.177) ... modern psychology's unfounded and misplaced faith in "free will" ... rides tandem with its equally wrong-footed obsession with "toughness". (p.91) ... curiosity and mastery ... deserve thoroughgoing discussion because there are poorly appreciated ... anomalies in relation to "empowerment" (p.90) How many clients presenting for psychotherapy are melancholic ... from not measuring up? How many could depart from their first consultation happier (w)armed with a simple exhortation to draw satisfaction from what they actually are rather than what their culture apparently expects of them; from whom and what others unconditionally are; what is more, from how the world actually presents itself - with all its prejudices and intolerances (p.94) A clarification ... Embracing the world as it really is, including "all its prejudices and intolerances", our unmanufactured selves and its other inhabitants as they really are, is not at all equivalent ... to resigned reconciliation with inequality or injustice. Quite the contrary. (p.95) The road unravels of its own accord as our footsteps increase in number. We are foolish if we insist on ourselves as cartographers, or too often fix co-ordinates for our "spiritual journeys" ... Thoreau encouraged all of us ... to live the life we have imagined ... Following his counsel, we found ourselves doing what comes naturally. (p.175)	Conversely, polar positions on "free will" and "scientific determinism" - both of which are ostensibly macho in character - are jointly or severally tenable; e.g., The radical behaviorist (aka "hawk") such as Burrhus Frederic Skinner may be a "scientific determinist" - a person who considers that all behaviour is accounted for by cause and effect relationships without needing to resort to either the existence or effect of subjective human will. (p.44) and ... radical behaviorism and its corollary, "scientific determinism", is a discovery of Western civilisation, more particularly an American one, yet we all know that North America is the "land of the free", and that everyone there has the capacity for realising their own fortunes wilfully. How could this have happened then? Is everything psychological determined? Or is nothing determined except that which we impose masterfully on patiently waiting destiny? Or is neither of these verifiable but rather there is something of "truth" in between? (p.90) A doctor who advises you to "pull yourself together" is well-established to do so ... we can easily "will" our way into happiness. Wishing we were somebody else - or a perfect version of who we actually are - is only harmless fantasy. Mother Nature, although rather more experienced than ourselves, is better suited to be overruled than heeded.

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"

Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>An original scientific developmental account of "moral psychology"</i>		
It is possible to build a bridge between scientific and analytical psychology. Nine Seahorses is a progressive case - not a final one. The TA Parent ego state is built - structurally - as an S-S module. S-S and perceptual learning account sufficiently for the TA introjects in P₂ (P₃, A₃, C₃). The TA Child ego state is built as an operant module from S-R to R-S. This S-R / R-S gradient elegantly accounts for all important phenomena recognised in TA: <i>inter alia</i> injunctions, cultural inheritance, "early decisions", the "life script", drivers and the biographic evolution of C₂. The language acquisition device or LAD is co-emergent and bound with R-S. Node formulation is LAD-injected. Parent and Child are both R-S functionally - discriminable on the basis of an "I (want ...)" versus "You (should ...)" expansion concurrent and bound with the S-R / R-S transition. There are significant implications for TA psychotherapy; e.g., Pavlovian CR dissolution militates against the power of counterinjunctions and introjects.	... two strands of the discipline that informs sanity have evolved quite independently ... We have troubled ourselves to lay out the ... theoretical fundamentals that underpin each ... Is there some manner in which these two may be reconciled organically? (p.133) ... the TA Parent ego state is ... the ... register of S-S learning whereas TA Child comprises an "early" S-R register which becomes ... updated with "guileful" R-S ... during some developmental phase in which language is acquired (p.173) ... Thorndikeian S-R ... permits of "pre-conscious" and deep contextual (situational) learning of exactly the kind that TA recognises: a "weight" of "unspoken" family culture inherited through Child ego state aether (p.144) ... say ... the human infant slides from S-R to R-S ... at some time around its passage from "sensori-motor" into language ... we are positing that it is R-S itself that tells human language-competency apart, with all its ... corollaries. (p.146) ... whilst the introjects (P₃, A₃, C₃) ... simply reinvent themselves constantly with experience ... it is a different story with the TA "Child in the Child" (C₁ in C₂) ... diffuse stimulus "nodes" for "situation" (or "context") combined in some way with a (Thorndikeian) response "node" relinquish themselves to more specific "nodes" representing mentally rehearsable Skinnerian responses (Rs) and anticipated outcomes (Ss). The node representing the "new" response may (or does) now have a language competency inbuilt, and may or may not be otherwise equivalent ... to the old one. Perhaps the "slide" from S-R to R-S involves a node-creating or node-transforming threshold whereby some trigger ... from a "Language Acquisition Device" - precipitates new node formulation and, in the aggregate, an entirely fresh mental set. (p.147) In TA, the Critical Parent addresses the Child ego state with the "expectation" (thus, surely a Skinnerian R) of a particular outcome (S) from Compliant Adapted Child, although it may not obtain it if Rebellious Adapted Child steps in (S). Nurturing Parent has an anticipative quality about it too (wanting good things for Child). (p.140) The difference between "co-creating" new ... life with an S-R-imprisoned "King Baby" is now transparently at odds with the task of "co-rehabilitating" with an R-S-wielding sociopath wishing to "go straight". The justification for releasing "Free Child" in TA therapy is more obvious than ever (p.146)	Contraindications include arguments that: there are many different "truths" and no hope for general or "unified" theories; as in the business of life itself, it is better to wait until a complete account is available than venture a few steps in a worthwhile direction; TA as a body has nothing to do with science or scientific psychology, desires no liaison with academic psychology and - as a body - is under no obligation to indulge its capacity to think; Pavlovian conditioning is an erroneous or misplaced account of TA Parent conceptually; S-R cannot account for cultural or trans-generational injunctions logically; there are fundamental tensions between the structural accounts of the ego states in a "moral psychology" and the established functional character of the TA ego states; a comprehensive associative account of the TA ego states makes no useful contribution to TA theory or TA psychotherapy; empirical discoveries in clinical contexts contradict the Nine Seahorses model; it is proven that pre-verbal human infants and / or non-human vertebrates possess R-S operant learning; propositions about node formulation are as far-fetched (and therefore just as untestable and untenable) as Freud's account of "mind".

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"		
Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>The various pressures on "conscience" and limits on its mutability</i>		
A universal understanding of "conscience" is both possible and available.	... conscience is: a quiet strain, having the capacity to become psychologically "noisy", which has the effect of pressure to settle upon one or more beliefs, attitudes, intentions or behaviours (including not doing certain things as well as doing them) and which is experienced subjectively as psychological conflict - usually mild, but potentially deadly. (p.49)	If it were established that conscience is entirely metaphysical versus entirely material in origin, or vice versa, our definition would hold water either way.
A pressure on "conscience": the "moral environment" ...	In a "moral psychology", the "moral environment", put simply, is the context in which we must be sane. (p.57)	Our definition would be redundant, however, if it made no sense for all practical purposes; or if scientific determinism were to hold sway (because then it would be of precious little practical use).
A pressure on "conscience": the "weight of human history" ...	... the "moral environment" comprises the various "worlds" that all of us each inhabits (p.60)	Other contraindications include arguments that:
A pressure on "conscience": mind-buggering ancestral injunctions (S-R) and counterinjunctions (S-S) ...	The "weight of human history" ... formal and informal laws, customs, values, mores and traditions ... These are always eruptions of deep history (p.61)	there are rudimentary disconnects between any of these identified pressures and the subjective experience of "mind";
A pressure on "conscience": all biographic conditioning ...	... "aberrant CERs" ... encompassing ... the mind-buggering "spiritual blindness" of swathes of our ancestors (p.174)	there are rudimentary disconnects in between any of these identified pressures where we have posited an interaction or conversation amongst them which generates "conscience" pressure;
A pressure on "conscience": the TA Parent ego state (biographic S-S) ...	Classical and operant conditioning generate conditioned emotional states ... "anticipatory hope" and "avoidant fear", a complex combination of each present in any individual's ... profile. (p.17)	there is an exclusive, hitherto unidentified source of "conscience";
A pressure on "conscience": the TA Child ego state (biographic S-R) ...	O'Grady (Skinner) said ... "Repeat!"; and we obeyed. Again and again. (p.156)	it is, after all, possible that personal "will" can exert itself over "conscience" - which supposes amongst other things that (i) we are wrong elsewhere (Chapter 9) about the existence or potency of human "free will", (ii) we are wrong to suggest that there may be metaphysical (including natural and divine) sources of "conscience", (iii) we haven't discovered the technology for such manipulation, or, (iv) we have - but the powerful people amongst whom it is exercised presently are just too busy (and modest) to demonstrate their secret to the remainder of us.
A pressure on "conscience": the TA Child ego state (biographic R-S) ...	... pressures within conscience ... include the various "impasses" that would be recognised in TA, especially between matching Parent and Child ego states (e.g., P ₂ -C ₂ and P ₁ -C ₁). (p.169)	
A pressure on "conscience": self-centred fear (Roosevelt) ...	Is there not a "natural" kind of fear ... and an "unnatural" one that we bring to the table ourselves? (p.169)	
A pressure on "conscience": the unconditioned response (UR) ...	Food reliably elicits salivation. Because no learning is required, the food is referred to as an "unconditioned" stimulus or US and the salivation as an "unconditioned" response or UR. (p.9)	
A pressure on "conscience": nature's whisper ...	Do nothing. Unplug the 'phone. Attend to the whisper ... (p.154)	
A pressure on "conscience": the divine prerogative known by the believer ...	Dawkins recognises neither the possibility nor utility of a thinking person possessing a realistic take of their place in nature whilst simultaneously seeking religious or spiritual inspiration for living. (p.40)	
There are limits on what can be "re-written".	If ... "will" could "defeat" ... conscience, there would be little unhappiness ... few if any counsellors or psychotherapists and ... a much reduced incentive for ... religious belief. (p.162)	

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"		
Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>"Moral psychology" 1: acceptance, transcendent trust and surrender</i>		
A person pursuing a "moral psychology" is at liberty to defer to any authority they may choose. Sanity resides in the "successful" combination of "conscience" with the "moral environment". Tolstoy's provocation (p.68) is an exemplar in "moral psychology". A simple appreciation of the world and its inhabitants - and, thereby, a starting point for sanity itself - can be had for the price of a little attention. A better appreciation of the world and its inhabitants can be had for accepting that lousy feelings mostly are a problem of perception rather than difficult circumstances. Trusting the process of developing a personal "moral psychology" mysteriously alters the course of personal lives for the better. "Spiritual surrender" is a powerful asset that - once it has been experienced - can be applied as a personal habit in daily living. "Spiritual surrender" is a most potent associative link shredder ... perhaps like sudden, rapid habituation.	<i>Some people like to consider themselves morally self-sufficient ... Others like to be guided by what they regard as human wisdom ... Still others seek and find divine inspiration. A "moral psychology" is accessible by all such persons (p.44)</i> <i>Provisionally, it is in the perseverance of an "Accountable Self" in the "moral environment" that sanity stands or falls ... in the acquisition ... of a personal "moral psychology" that unstealable understanding resides. (p.60)</i> <i>Tolstoy's provocation ... as perfect a model as ... possible to imagine (p.68)</i> <i>... wait till we appreciate (p.57)</i> <i>... our perception ... renders things awry ... it is to ourselves that we must look ... to put things right (p.58)</i> <i>... the more we became willing to awaken in these first two ways, the more the course of our lives seemed actually and reliably to improve ... Was this a trick of perception or some other enigmatic but ludicrously apparent reality? (p.58)</i> <i>... what have we done when ... we ... accepted something about ourselves ... or another person, or the various "worlds" of the "moral environment" ... This ... yielding ... "letting go" ... brings peace. (p.136)</i> <i>What, then, is "transcendent trust" ... Very acceptance ... is its basic element: we accept (with a sigh of relief from our own misapplied and atrophied efforts) the world as it is rather than as we would engineer it or, at least, we accept the limits of our own capacity for moulding it ... we found ourselves "morally aligned" with the various "worlds" of our experience with no price to pay except continued co-operation ... Where is the fear that drove us? It has all but vanished ... So it is with administration of our "minds". (p.166)</i> <i>If there is any pre-requisite at all for sanity, surely it is a very simple "spiritual" yielding (p.52)</i> <i>"spiritual surrender" possessed the capacity to break associative links as effectively as one-trial flavour aversion learning created them. (p.166)</i> <i>The effect of surrender is so simple, sudden and spectacular that it transcends those "stars and spangles" of our imaginations as they once attended the prospect of the rewards promised by O'Grady - seeming to shred to ribbons in an instant a great proportion of all the associative links that chained us to our own bludgeoning incongruence. (p.175)</i>	Contraindications include arguments that: human beings are not "moral creatures" and have no need of "moral psychology"; human beings are "morally self-sufficient" in the sense that they do not need each other in order to establish personal integrity; human beings can effect or acquire a "moral psychology" by reading about it rather than actually doing it; fear is an illusion and can be denied or avoided (by "will"); our tendency to impose "will" on each other is natural, inevitable and "morally neutral"; most of us human beings neither require nor can muster conviction or courage of the quality demonstrated by Tolstoy; ingratitude is co-directional with personal sanity; dissatisfaction is more fittingly attributed to errors of creation / nature or the faults of others than errors of perception, or other kinds of shortcomings in ourselves; appreciation in a life does not influence its course; "acceptance" is for losers and for suckers; even if "spiritual surrender" is subjectively real, it has no material corollary or effect; "spiritual surrender" is for suckers and for losers - the way to get through life is to fight to the death.

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"		
Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>"Moral psychology" 2: a Seahive of shareable subjective experience</i>		
Each human being may be identified with an "unwritten" or "Original Self" (and may align themselves with any account of how that Self came into being or materialised according to their own choosing). Each human being possesses an "Accountable Self" which is "morally competent" and "morally responsible" - yet fundamentally simple in its executive function which is to align itself with - or reject - (i.e., "settle upon") various "moral alternatives". The manner or style in which the "Accountable Self" is applied determines the quality of our subjective life as we know it in the "Experienced Self" (aka "Existential Self") - particularly by mitigation of "conscience" pressure and, thereby, sanity. The "Seahive" facilitates appreciation of such processes. Although vacillations may occur, a bi-directional output (see the diagram) is correct: the "Accountable Self" acquiesces ("Yes") or refuses ("No"). Prudent "spiritual stocktaking" assists with establishing favourable "moral direction" and, thereby, sanity.	... a new life precipitates an "Original Self" which ... was nature's doing ... For a theoretical moment ... is uncontaminated by earthly experience. (p.168) Sooner or later we must bring to bear to that perplexity our "Accountable Self" which, having the capacity to effect "moral discernments", discharges ... "willingness to align" ("OK then ...") as opposed to belligerence to invitation ("No" or "Yeah but ...") ... "settling upon" alternatives and reducing mental tension ("cognitive dissonance"). (p.174) A "Seahive" ... Its focal point is at the ... frontier between the "Written Self" and the "Accountable Self". This is where the "moral action" takes place ... Our preparedness to embrace ["spiritual surrender"] ... determines the quality of our (Existential or) "Experienced Self". We can "go nuts" without it ... or we can soar like Jonathan - knowing it courses beneath our wings. (p.180) Many won't venture here without having acquired a sense of obligation (p.149) "soul-searching" ... Part III. (p.165) Then how has my "Written Self" been expressed both in my "mind", and in the world at large? My TA Parent ego state P_2 is replete with significant (P_3, A_3, C_3) CSs ... Have I accepted every invitation to a Pavlovian response (CR) with my "moral capacity" for recognising its "moral value" ... My Child ego state C_2 is threaded through with an ancient and barely recognisable patchwork of willowy S-R fibres ... Have I succumbed to every coercion ... Perhaps I have tried to flex operant muscle ... but what "control" did I truly possess over my R-S repertoire? ... Did I dance to Skinner's tune? And what of all the direct and open invitations (USs) ... did very God or very nature ... ever murmur with utter softness and timeless patience to me (p.152) ... a divine source of conscience would not in the least be refutable by mere, squealing mortals; still, don't we let our own toddlers off the hook just for demonstrating the willingness to fall sufficiently well back in line? (p.174) But how far can a person bring intrapsychic congruence to themselves ... it is a question of illuminating what of all this we can establish for ourselves and how much we wisely defer to relationship with other parties. We may change only the writing on the wall. If we try to demolish the bricks and mortar - even their very foundations - surely we will risk far too great a "restoration" for own good. (p.168)	Even supposing we are reincarnated, a human being still enters the world "unwritten" by the biographic experience it is about to encounter. The only serious contraindication to the "Original Self" is the argument that we are self-fabricated. Other contraindications include arguments that: "conscience" is "avoidable" in the sense that (i) conscience pressures do not exist, (ii) conscience pressures are always mild and never severe, (iii) conscience pressures are experienced by only some people, or (iv) they can be neglected or overlooked in any event (without any serious consequences for personal sanity); some people get through all of life without having their moral shirt-tail tugged severely enough to feel "morally tested" (and that must include me); the "Seahive" comprises (i) erroneous elements or misleading elements, (ii) erroneous or misleading interconnections, or, (iii) erroneous or misleading processes; human beings do not require assistance from each other in order to conduct themselves in a morally informed and prudent fashion; all or some of us require no straightening out of the kind implied by the notion or pursuit of "spiritual stocktaking"; God or nature didn't create us "morally flawed" - we are "finished products".

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"		
Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>Interrupting the tragic trajectory of "descending vicious spirals"</i>		
"Emptiness" is a useful generic term for the aversive feelings we experience when things have "gone wrong". Perhaps it is rather the converse of the "completeness" we feel when romantically in love, or when everything is going our way or - better - the peace we know when we realise that everything is just as it is supposed to be (and, what is more, that that is fine if not just OK with us). All of us indulge in "distractions" to change the way we feel - to compensate for such "emptiness". These indulgences have the capacity to become addictive - although they don't always become so within our awareness. "Too much of a good thing" can spiral out of control to the point of becoming quite deadly. We can become "spiritually blind" to the process and ourselves as participants. Adverse social trends affect young people especially and are better inhibited early than interrupted late. You can't win a bad game. What happens at the end of the line is a lottery.	"Emptiness" is the ... aversive discharge of "conscience" ... feeling ... when we haven't been true to ourselves. (p.154) "Emptiness", also, is an apposite expression for the "cross-up" TA locates at the "switch" in a "game" (p.155) The qualitative aspect of "emptiness" is its unpleasantness, and the quantitative dimension its dreadful capacity to excruciate. (p.157) That feeling ... lies like solidified lard on the top of a jug of meat fat ... We find ourselves ... in a "descending vicious spiral" of isolation, loneliness and inferiority. (p.68) ... there is a nasty "vicious spiral" that injects itself surreptitiously into every declining life; i.e., the cunning assailant that is isolation (p.155) Don't we all take a little comfort to change the way we feel - for merely a moment (that's all) (p.154) ... that stereotypical repertoire of indulgent behaviour ... when we feel "stressed", "out of sorts" (p.156) In the dreamy beginning, we crossed the threshold, and something wonderful happened. Our eyes were opened ... the stars and spangles of our imaginations descended sparkling before us. (p.156) Our indulgence seems to fill the "emptiness" ... if we are in "control" ... everything falls within our grasp, and there is nothing left to fear. (p.156) It is only when we are "spiritually blind" and persist in our own self-deception that no "moral dividend" accrues to any party at all. (p.155) ... such a phenomenon is happening at an increasing rate and is more ... common at a younger age in most ... nations (p.68) ... the discrepancy between what young people say they want for themselves and what they actually do. (p.71) An interrupted ... trajectory is better than an ignored one ... especially true for younger people because ... they must endure more years of it. (p.70) At painful last, the moment of reckoning arrives when ... this "self" ... screams at the heavens, "Help me..." (p.147) So what happens next? ... depends on ... the ... readiness of the distressed person to go about things in a different way ... and ... the relevance of response (p.75)	Contraindications include arguments that: "emptiness" is not an apt expression for these sorts of subjective states; feelings of personal incongruence (conflict), inferiority and loneliness are not that common and - anyway - are easily remedied; "comfort-taking" per se is too rare - or of too little import to pay such attention to it; only some people get a little too partial to, or addicted to, their behavioural bad habits (from the most innocuous to the most deadly) - and that is not a problem for the remainder of us; "descending vicious spirals" do not happen; "descending vicious spirals" happen - but only to a very small minority of spineless characters; folks can "will" their way out of feeling lousy and these processes need never get off the ground; if you can be ready to change at the end of the line you can be ready to change at any time before that; the youth of today are their own worst enemy; young people have only themselves to blame (for the "state of the country" and for their cultural inheritance); ethically speaking there is no collective responsibility for such problems as these; what happens in other countries is hardly any concern domestically.

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"		
Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>The importance of realising the adequacy of the treatment response</i>		
The evolution of the various silos within modern psychotherapy has generated diverse views of aetiology ("knottedness") which exacerbate confusion in already befuddled prospect clients. The system as a whole is chaotic to a person needing or seeking treatment because it operates across diverse operational sectors in unco-ordinated silos. The identification of the nature of a presenting problem - rather than its subjective interpretation within one school of philosophy - is such a vital stage of treatment that it should properly front the whole system as a single point of entry / referral gateway. Psychotherapy needs self-examination just as much as its troubled clients. Most "patients" in psychological health are not "experts" on their own condition (or they would have found their way out of trouble). The arguments for group therapy are overwhelming and correctly inform the core of any self-examination on the part of the treatment system as a whole entity. Paid-for services are susceptible to contamination by (subtle) conflicts of interests.	... the "relevance" of a treatment response has to do with the assumptions that are made ... about how and why - precisely - a person is "all knotted up" ... the various traditions ... are just alternative ways of looking at the same problem, and none of them is entirely right; after all, none has furnished a complete explanation, and none has produced any universal "cure". (p.86) ... the therapist requires an appreciation of ... match or fit between their available response and the true nature of the presenting problem (p.86) Does each practitioner the suffering person encounters once ... capitulation has started possess a capacity for immediate and accurate diagnosis? No. We know this from collective experience of the "revolving doors" syndrome (p.81) What parallels of our personal discomfiture exist in any treatment system at any one time? (p.76) ... surely, psychotherapy needs as much self-examination as its clients. If it doesn't appreciate this ... it risks the same consequences as the avoidant individual ... i.e. ... self-destruction ... If the self-examination is earnest, the redirection is ... favourable ... There is also a tendency for relationships to change for the better. (p.77) ... in ... Great Britain anyway ... there is a personhood known as the "expert patient" ... Compromised people lack "expertise" to the extent that they are laden with ignorance about how the treatment system works - doubled once with mental confusion - and twice with their own denial ... Their appreciation of options ... may be severely curtailed (p.78) The power-cost ratio of group therapy is so massive compared with individual therapy that it is a wonder that individual therapy prevails (p.184) Is there anything inherently inferior about a service that is conditional on the payment of a fee? Perhaps not if, as some of you say, a client needs to hurt in the pocket as well as in the heart in order to gain the starting momentum necessary to effect "moral progress". Perhaps so, unless you have become so free of "moral corruption" yourselves ... that you can retain all of your personal and professional interests in separately-dug millponds where they may never overlap ... until we have learned to love each other (when money for love shall be rendered an old-fashioned form of leverage), you are (nearly) all that we have and, so ... thank you (p.185)	Contraindications include arguments that: all psychotherapeutic approaches understand psychopathology in the same way - it is just the jargon that varies between the assorted disciplines; one type of psychotherapy is just as good as any other for a given psychological problem; one type of psychotherapy is just as good as any other for a particular prospective client; one psychotherapist is just as good as another for a given prospective client - personal chemistry is no facilitator of client treatment or recovery; psychotherapy for the most part should take place unwitnessed - behind closed doors; the treatment response as a whole is sufficiently well aligned internally and co-ordinated; there is no waste within the system as a whole - clients land in the right spot first time - every time; psychologically vulnerable people are "experts" on their own condition, know how to get appropriate treatment, have the confidence, strength and resilience to navigate their way into the system and - where public funds are provided - should be left in charge of their own treatment budgets; all the foregoing are academic anyway because the whole system has sufficient capacity, no waiting lists and is universally affordable.

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"

Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>Empathy, poachers-turned-gamekeeper (PTGs) and competent coxswains</i>		
Healthy people can help unhealthy people get well. Those who know the route into harbour (the sanctuary of the treatment system and a suitable berth within it) at first hand make the best coxswains - more so than those commonly familiar with the safety of dry land and who can afford to wait patiently to ply their trade - it makes perfect sense to afford the former the authority of harbourmasters. Similarly, PTGs - having a peculiar capacity for empathy - are uniquely placed to be of useful service to those who haven't yet found their way. They are supremely qualified for advocacy and for getting group work off the ground. They liberate rather than lead. They may be willing to work without profit as a primary motive. "Spiritual deference" in peer-mentoring - being concerned with principles rather than personalities - is healthy and quite at odds with the spectre of "gurus" - or anybody else who sells what they have to offer on the back of some variety of human charisma. Wherever there is a great deal of human authority, there is often a swollen bank account in tandem.	<i>There is a ... case for "competent coxswains" ... to steer these distressed vessels into ... harbour; to explain what can't be appreciated unaided; to afford temporary assistance with navigation, and to defend against misunderstandings and inattention. (p.81)</i> <i>Poachers-turned-gamekeeper (PTGs) are people who have turned a corner ... PTGs need no training to recognise the vital change in another that has already occurred in themselves ... they are able - and often want to - help shipwrecked sailors reach dry land ... To the unfamiliar eye, or the ignorant sceptic, such helpfulness may be interpreted patronisingly as "rescue". If it is badly motivated helping ... then that is what it is. But if it is offered in a spirit of compassion and love, then that precisely is what it is. You can ... tell the difference between a PTG and a sceptic - it is ... proportional to the income they receive for being loving ... they possess a superlative capacity for holding a "spiritual mirror" to the person who becomes ready to examine ... the "bad game" which we all play in degrees, but lose in the end. The PTGs' appreciation of ... the ways in which their own confidences have been respected by PTGs of the past ... assures not only the security of the apprentice's trust, but also the "spiritual equality" that combats all the ... imbalances ... that can contaminate professional environments ... PTG principles ... may be applied in a vast array of ... settings (p.182)</i> <i>Fellow travellers ... are the best companions if their stake in affairs is equivalent to ours (i.e., honest self-appraisal). In those environments, the prospect of a broken confidence, or an insensitive (far less judgemental) incursion is all but eliminated. But the requirement for failsafe is a spurious defence, for no protection is needed against the phalanx of one's own true convictions. The problem is one of getting started with sufficient momentum to build up steam, until that gnawing and ravenous sinkhole that was the past becomes truly lost to history. (p.149)</i> <i>It is patently obvious that someone who has similar experience to another possesses the greater capacity for empathy and, so, someone who wishes to step into the helping shoes of one so qualified must be at least one of: virtuously willing when no-one better placed will do it; better qualified on a net basis by other assets, or representing a response system that is protecting its own power or financial interests on unethical grounds. (p.78)</i>	Contraindications include arguments that: possessing first hand experience of another person's predicament confers no significant advantage in matters of interpersonal identification, trust and mutual confidence (factors known to favourably affect the process and progress of psychotherapy); qualifications other than direct experience of the trajectory of a life course and recovery from a "descending vicious spiral" weigh heavier in the balance when considering how best to help washed up people; e.g., being clever as evidenced by having read lots of books, having passed lots of exams, having lots of academic qualifications, having lots of letters after your name, having a privileged background, being wealthy, being well-embedded in the social establishment, being "well-connected", or having a patronising and superior attitude; the risk that - when things go wrong as inevitably they do when people are psychologically sick - "competent coxswains" or PTGs might be unfairly blamed outweighs the arguments in favour of delegating or leaving certain matters in their hands; the best things in life cost money and the more things cost the better they are; also, stiff professional competence lends far greater impetus to a stranded person's psychological redemption than "unconditional positive regard" or anything else reverberant with "empathy" or "love".

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"		
Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>Spiritual equality and togetherness are exercised in group therapy</i>		
Have we forgotten our sense of togetherness? If we step back for a moment from the hustle and bustle of our daily lives - leaving aside for a moment all the natural anxieties that compel us to stay on the move in pursuit of our "survival needs" - it isn't difficult to conjure in our minds a sense of universal fellowship amongst all peoples - with a simple focus on the humanity we share. According to one point of view, it is only in lending emphasis to unity, rather than competition, that we will save ourselves from "mutually assured destruction". It is more productive to focus on what human beings have in common than what separates or divides them. A "moral psychology" is for Everyman (the title of an unattributed 15th century play): of course, we mean pure equality as distinct from sexual or any other type of discrimination. Our "shareable subjective experience" is always a good starting point for group therapy. We are in this together. We need each other. We don't organise ourselves well.	Picture ... 6,800,000,000 ... people ... The ... population ... from which modern humans evolved "Out of Africa" may have numbered only a few thousand ... When we assimilate ... that our sun ... counts as but one star amongst about ... 30-70 sextillion ... we can hardly avoid the ... sentiment - that we are small ... But nowhere is it written that we must be alone - or separated (pp.97;99) Could we not ... confess ... how ... little we ... are able to establish about our mutual differences, and immeasurably how much more we might have in common. (p.29) Whereas TA autonomy may have been the ... prerogative of "certain fortunate people" ... a "moral psychology" is for nobody if ... not for Everyman. (p.177) ... can there be any meaningful psychology that is not for Everyman including the least intellectually agile? (p.99) ... for satisfaction and fulfilment are for Everyman, or they are nothing (p.52) What human beings do appear to have ... is a "shareable subjective experience" ... seemingly, hinged squarely on our consciousness which, by ordinary understanding, is intimately bound with our very self-awareness and our awareness of other human beings. (p.43) You may ... describe your personal suffering as "beyond words" ... if we are generous, we can readily conjecture your pain ... empathy in its most wonderful, capacious guise is a fantastically practical way to love. (p.157) ... malaise is dissolved in ... togetherness ... why ... would we wish to render ourselves immune from each other's pain ... Groups are for illumination of the person and ... the togetherness that is natural for humans who lead perverse lives if it is ... absent. (p.160) There is a dimension of cogency in that "other" relationship which is at its most potent when it resembles closely the circumstances in which we must discharge our sanity ... we can approximate those contexts ... in groups - if we are ... brave and willing. (p.95) The long and short of everything else left to say in favour of group therapy has mostly to do with clean power - and honesty ... All told, the argument for groups is overwhelming. (p.184) The response may come unpersuaded from intimate community. Then again it probably won't ... because we don't organise ourselves that well. (p.75)	Contraindications include arguments that: human competition is as old as the hills, utterly natural, and shouldn't be inhibited by communists, liberals or bleeding hearts; what we have in common is less a desire to level the human playing field than it is to win the game of life - against each other; the notion of any kind of human equality - and, so, that includes "spiritual equality" - is fundamentally flawed: nature made us unequal and that is the way we will remain; the idea that everyone can be reasonably happy in this life is hopelessly ambitious; if we occasion pain to each other - or any other cost for that matter - in the course of pursuing personal ambitions, that is simply the way it is - it is not a matter for a "moral psychology"; "empathy" is a flawed and wasted concept - either it doesn't and cannot exist (we can't imagine what it is like to be another person or feel as somebody else does), or attempts at trying to understand other people's "frames of reference" serve no useful purpose; "shareable subjective experience" in groups is just another way of describing "gossip" - one-to-one encounters are more efficacious; we organise ourselves in (nuclear) families instinctively - the only other kind of organisation that we correctly encourage is that which generates economic growth.

SAMPLE FALSIFIABLE PROPOSITIONS IN A "MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"

Falsifiable propositions	Sample Nine Seahorses references (with page number)	Foreseeable contraindications
<i>Collective responsibility is confined to safety nets and education</i>		
People who are in trouble with their "minds", near inevitably, lack resources of every significant kind. It could be you. Families are great - but not all families have their act together - all of the time. It takes several generations to change culture. Young people may end up in prison because they have been ruthless, unthinking or simply unable to see or hinder their own "descending vicious spiral". Incarceration is the correct option for anybody who is a danger to society and is unwilling to change. The best judge of such matters is a panel of PTGs. There aren't good reasons for locking up people otherwise: there are many arguments against it. People who have offended others are best off in the community making suitable amends. We are in this together. Safety nets are needed as a first priority. Education is the only other necessary investment. We get what we vote for. Change begins in psychology, not politics. Mature civic community is means and end.	<i>Should young people ... or anybody else ... be left to establish a "moral psychology" under their own auspices and resources however scant those might be at a time of special need? (p.71)</i> <i>... when we became incapacitated ... our tolerance for our own hypocrisy? (p.76)</i> <i>... upon whom ... should responsibility fall in the ... situation where a teenager incarcerated for an acquisitive offence ... petitions successfully ... against a treatment system designed, implemented and funded by a government, arising out of failure to administer adequate substitute medication ... in time to head off the discomfort of withdrawal ... in ... the ... prison cell? Having identified the respective parties in the scenario ... "Why so?" and "How so?" (p.70)</i> <i>Not many of us would discount ... the role of the family ... some would let it remain there to venture nowhere else. Still others prefer to exercise a "social conscience" and we may ... envisage a dimension from zero involvement of government ... to the ... provision of ... safety nets - even compulsory education and community service (p.71)</i> <i>We don't provide sanctuaries within spitting distance of park benches (p.122) ... we have become blindly adept ... at talking about social safety nets ... but they do not exist in the number and forms that they might. (p.159)</i> <i>Then what safety nets might we correctly establish and vote to maintain? Only those that help people grow up in the way that we have done ourselves in order to vote for the system that created them ... Our sanctuaries may (indeed must) be threaded through with a reorientation programme ... Perhaps "moral crunch" can be obviated with forewarning. As it takes more than a generation or two for families to reform cultural inheritance, our "citizenship" curriculum may be just the right locus for preparing our youth ... Now, we have footed a bill only for conditional sanctuaries and contemporary citizenship in schools. No bureaucrats. No need for argument or upsets. Clean consciences all round. Win-win. (p.159)</i> <i>Although we have lost ... the old-fashioned ... conviction politician ... "moral vacuousness" isn't all the fault of the swanky new political classes ... We must look to ourselves ... In democracies anyway, we get what we vote for (p.159)</i> <i>... our challenge is less a political one than a psychological one ... hope for our future lies in our own hearts and minds ... personal change is possible. (p.103)</i>	Contraindications include arguments that: it will not be me - nor my children - nor any other member of my family - nor anybody about whom I care - or rely upon economically; the right and proper environment where young people learn to stay out of trouble is the (nuclear) family - the correct order of priorities is to re-establish families - whence appropriate social education will automatically ensue; it is better to have (taxable and) legalised "opium for the masses" (nicotine, alcohol, more narcotics for those who have become addicted to them) - on the grounds that quietened (potential) trouble-makers are less socially bothersome and less of a strain on the public purse that way (sedated) - leaving the remainder of us (who know how to keep our noses clean) free to get on with minding our own business (thereby attending to economic growth which benefits everybody - naturally); people who have broken the law are irredeemable; revenge and punishment are valid reasons for incarceration, for such motives do not further victimise people who have been offended; we are hugely indebted to the "swanky new political classes" for all they have done for us - it is better to have remunerated people talking about safety nets than recovered people building them; it is better not to rock the boat by thinking for ourselves.

Sample assets accruing from a "moral psychology"

To the extent that a "moral psychology" demonstrates its own efficacy (to those who know its nurturing properties at first hand or who may be willing to venture on a test drive) or survives Popperian scrutiny (for the prevaricating sceptic), its capacity for re-establishing and healing human affairs knows few restrictions. Its appeal is universal as, from its voluminous heart, it issues quiet, gentle and persistent invitations to every person's capacity for embracing sweeter destiny. We have been at pains to emphasise that "moral psychology" is barred to no-one (i.e., it is for *Everyman*). It separates us from each other only by the degree of our willingness to submit ourselves to it. As individuals we are each chained to nobody. Our objective is personal freedom obtained through respectful recognition of mutual, common and interdependent interests. But we are imposed upon by no-one, and we venture morally only into our own shadows - or where we are cordially invited. We are forewarned against - and need never succumb to - the charms of the Pied Piper of Hamelin²³⁷ even if, all the while, we had been tapping our feet obligingly to Skinner's mesmeric (R-S) tune. "Moral psychology" is a programme of personal, family and group or community development that need cost next to nothing financially. It takes a little organisation because its psychology is hinged on group processes: it is never a solo effort except between *rendezvous*. It is best achieved through spontaneous interest and low-level operations. As an indulgence to the "moral environment" contemplated in Chapter 6, let us reconsider briefly the young person at its hopeful centre. Adolescents have ever sought each other's company - for camaraderie and for solace - at worst mischief (our own teenagers fall in with the "wrong" crowd). A "moral psychology" harnesses and favours their natural instinct for "togetherness" and the solidarity it promises. The "healthy" group - unprompted by its elders - generates its own (narrower) boundaries on waywardness. The "grown-up" work is limited to providing the pre-emptive education and safety nets to which we alluded in Chapter 9. A deleterious life course ("vicious spiral"), early set, too often portends a tragic trajectory, but failure of personal direction - as in adult lives - is only ever temporary, and separation short of abandonment is an acceptable last resort. There is nothing wrong with the strictures of a morally sound formal community for those who are likely to "fall off the rails" without one. Incarceration of young people is expensive, but let's have a new "moral economics" for social policy. Teenage conceptions happen because boys and girls don't say "No" each to themselves. All other factors in reckless conceptions represent unfavourable pressures on that inner resilience. The instinct is an imperious one as we know. When young people possess a strong personal identity, and a sublime trust in their own futures - the rough weather of insecurities, peer pressure, and inhibition through intoxicification are afforded fewer chances to hold sway. Young people are like their soured counterparts in that they just want everything to be OK. We must tell them it is so, and mean it. They will do the same for the next generation until our expectations for *them* are outclassed by a social infrastructure and *Zeitgeist* beyond *their* wildest dreams. Our aspirant may not arise as a Baez or as a Mandela, but we have demonstrated that the greatest people of history remain unsung. Allegorical throughout, and relaxed about its objectives, Part III presents "moral psychology" in action: more, if you will allow, about doing or living it than explaining it.

²³⁷ as we saw in Chapter 9, all those illegitimate enticements to "conscience" that may lead us up the garden path to insanity: whether the unarticulated cudgel of our silent ancestors; the nuisance of corrupt biographic conditioning (re-writable depending on the limits of our psychotherapeutic technology); every unloving but refutable third party agenda and - especially - our own undisciplined fear and "spiritual blindness"



"OK So Far ..." (100% degradable but reusable by you)